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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
In recent years, immense power system outage events have happened across the 
world. This is not exceptional to the Malaysia power system whereby on 27 Jun 2013 
the system blackout occurred in the state of Sarawak, due to sudden dropping of 
frequency. Hence, power system risk assessment has become an important and 
mandatory task in planning, operation, maintenance and asset management of 
utilities. There have been efforts devoted in searching for new methods and 
procedures that effectively evaluate the risk of a power system. The objective of this 
study is to rank and determine the most common cause of power loss outages in the 
grid. This study implements multi criteria decision-making methods such as Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal 
Solution (TOPSIS). For data collection, it employed interviews of key participants, 
review of documents including unpublished official reports and annual reports. From 
the data collected there are four criteria identified, namely Duration Time (min), 
Estimated Maximum Loss of load (MW), Estimated Energy No Supplied (MW-min) 
and System Minutes. On the other hand, seven causes of power loss outages are 
identified, they are Treat To System Security, Equipment Failure, Fire or Explosion, 
Switching Risk, Tower Collapse, Accelerated Ageing of Equipment and Supervisory 
Control System Failure. Results of data analysis show that both methods have 
identified that Equipment Failure is the major cause, followed by Supervisory 
Control System Failure.  
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ABSTRAK 
 
 
 
 
Beberapa  tahun kebelakangan ini, beberapa gangguan bekalan elektrik yang besar 
berlaku di seluruh dunia. Negara Malaysia tidak terkecuali daripada perkara ini di 
mana pada 27 Jun 2013, gangguan bekalan elektrik yang besar berlaku di negeri 
Sarawak yang melibatkan penurunan frekuensi bekalan. Maka, penilaian risiko untuk 
sistem kuasa telah menjadi satu usaha yang penting dan wajib diadakan semasa 
perancangan, operasi, penyenggaraan, dan pengurusan aset untuk sistem elektrik. 
Pelbagai usaha telah dilakukan untuk mencari kaedah dan prosedur baru untuk 
menilai risiko ke atas sistem kuasa . Objektif kajian ini ialah untuk membuat 
penarafan dan mengenalpasti punca utama berlakunya gangguan bekalan elektrik 
pada grid. Kajian ini menggunakan kaedah penentu-keputusan pelbagai kriteria 
seperti Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) dan Technique for Order Preference by 
Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS). Bagi pengumpulan data, kaedah temubual 
dengan pihak yang terlibat dan rujukan dokumen yang berkaitan seperti laporan 
rasmi dan laporan tahunan telah dilakukan. Daripada data yang diperolehi, empat 
kriteria berkenaan gangguan bekalan elektrik telah dikenalpasti iaitu Duration Time 
(min), Estimated Maximum Loss of load (MW), Estimated Energy No Supplied (MW-
min) dan System Minutes. Selain itu, tujuh punca bagi gangguan bekalan elektrik 
turut dikenalpasti iaitu Ancaman kepada Keselamatan Sistem, Kerosakan peralatan, 
Kebakaran atau Letupan, Risiko Pensuaian, Keruntuhan Menara, Peralatan yang 
telah berusia, dan Kegagalan Sistem Kawalan Penyeliaan. Analisis data yang 
diperolehi menggunakan kedua-dua kaedah yang dinyatakan (AHP dan TOPSIS) 
menunjukkan Kerosakan Peralatan sebagai punca utama gangguan, diikuti oleh 
Kegagalan Sistem Kawalan Penyeliaan.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Project background 
 
 
Power system is a complex and large-scale nonlinear dynamic system. With the 
improvement of the functions of modern power system, the structure of the system is 
increasingly moving towards high degree of automation and involves with high-
voltage, long distance and large-capacity power. However, random failure sometimes 
appear in the system components, causes the system to function with some or all 
loss. Therefore, the risk prevention of power system operation has become an 
important and complex task 
The application of power system risk assessment has drawn ever-increasing 
interest in the electric utility industry, particularly since massive power outage events 
have occurred across the world in the past years. According to an EPRI (Electric 
Power Research Institute) report based on the national survey in all business sectors, 
the U.S. economy alone is losing between $104 and $164 billion a year due to power 
system outages. Severe power outage events have happened frequently in recent 
years. For instance, a major system disturbance separated the Western Electricity 
Coordinating Council (WECC) system in the west of north America into four islands 
on August 10,1996, interrupting electricity service to 7.5 million customers for 
period of up to nine hours. The 1998 blackout at the Auckland central business 
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district in New Zealand impacted 30 square blocks of the downtown area for about 
two months, resulting in lawsuits totalling $600 million against the utility.  On 
August 14, 2003, the massive blackout in the east of North   America covered eight 
states in the United States and two provinces in Canada, bringing about 50 million 
people into darkness for periods ranging from one to several days.  This is not 
exceptional to the Malaysia power system whereby on January 13, 2005 the system 
blackout occurred due to cascading overloads (The STAR, 2005). In Sabah, on April 
21, 2008, a transmission tower collapse triggered a major power blackout throughout 
the state (The STAR, 2008) and recently, a massive power outage caused by 
frequency dip occurred in Sarawak on June 27, 2013 (The STAR, 2013).  
Due to this, risk assessment has become a challenge and an essential business  
in the power utility industry today. 
 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
 
 
According to the statistics Figure 1.1 provided by Suruhanjaya Tenaga 2011 report, 
system minutes of the grid system in Sabah has been increased significantly from 
98.6% to 40.13 minutes and thus affecting the reliability of the whole supply system.  
 
Figure 1.1 : System minutes in Sabah 
 
Figure 1.2, Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4 shows that the number of unplanned 
interruptions per 1,000 customers has increased by 5.0% to 50.4% in Sabah for year 
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2011. The unplanned interruptions scored the highest percentage of 92% from the 
total interruption in year 2011. 
 
Figure 1.2 : Unplanned interruption per 1,000 customers  
 
 
Figure 1.3 : Planned interruption per 1,000 customers 
 
 
Figure 1.4 : Total interruption per 1,000 customers  
 
 There are various causes of the electricity supply interruptions such as natural 
disasters, equipment failures, overload, damaged by third parties, process and quality 
of work, trees, unknown causes, and others. If the most common cause of the 
electricity supply interruption can be identified, SESB could take preventive action 
to reduce the interruptions, as consumers demand to have an uninterruptable power 
supply. 
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Figure 1.5 : Causes of Unscheduled Supply Interruption  
 
 This thesis will identify the most common cause of power outages and 
identify the most suitable method of risk assessment in the transmission power 
system. 
 
 
1.3 Project objectives 
 
 
There are two objectives for this project: 
(i) To determine the most common cause of power outages in the grid 
(ii) To implement multi criteria decision-making methods such as AHP and 
TOPSIS 
 
 
1.4 Project scopes 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the most common cause of power  
system outages in the grid using multi criteria decision making.  This thesis will only 
focus on the risks in transmission line of the power system. The data analyzed is 
obtained from SESB. Consequently, it will develop a systematic approach to identify 
the priority based on the risk impact of the power system.  
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1.5  Contribution and claims of originality 
 
 
The research has identify the most common cause of power system outages in the 
grid, thus SESB should take preventive action to reduce the interruptions as 
maximum as possible. 
 
 
1.6  Thesis outline 
 
 
The subsequent chapters of the thesis are organized as follow : 
Chapter 1 highlights the occurrence of power-outages events in several 
countries around the world, statistics of an unplanned electricity interruption in 
Sabah, and the various causes of the electricity interruption in year 2011.  The 
objectives of this thesis are stated in this chapter.   
Chapter 2 is the literature review of this project. This review begins with the 
fundamental concepts of power system security and progresses through security 
assessments of different time frames. The deterministic and probabilistic approaches 
to security assessment are addressed and the limitations of each of these approaches 
are highlighted. The literature on the risk-based security assessments is also 
reviewed.  
Chapter 3 discusses about the project procedure and also approach used to 
implement the project. 
Chapter 4 shows the results and data analyses.  The risk assessment 
monitoring in electrical power system by using the Analytic Hierarchy Process 
(AHP) and TOPSIS is discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter 5 presents the project discussions, conclusions and 
recommendations.  This chapter will discuss about the conclusions of the project and 
also some future recommendations. 
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1.7 Summary 
 
 
This chapter of this thesis discusses about the introduction for the whole project.  
Firstly, the power-outages events are introduced in the first part.  Next, the problem 
statement is discussed.  Then, the next part is about the objectives and scopes of the 
project.  Lastly, the thesis outline is discussed which will give an overview for the 
reader about the thesis. 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
      
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
The fundamental objective of an electric power system is to supply its customers 
with electrical energy as economically as possible and with a reasonable assurance 
of continuity and quality. To maintain such security standards the power systems are 
required to be reliable. 
 Power system reliability reflects the adequacy and security in a power system 
(Billinton & Li, 1994), (Billinton, Firuzabad & Aboreshaid, 1997). Adequacy with 
regard to composite generation and transmission relates to the existence of both 
sufficient generation capacity to supply the energy demand and of the associated 
transmission facilities required to transport the energy to the major system load 
points. Security relates to the ability of the system to withstand unexpected failures 
and continue operating without interruption of supply to the consumers (Kirschen, 
2002), (Knight, 2000). Security assessment is a major concern in planning and 
operation of electric power systems. 
 The following sections of this chapter, review the literature relevant to this 
exploration of security issues. In particular, it covers the fundamental concepts of 
power system security, the deterministic and probabilistic approaches to security, 
and the techniques used in adequacy and security assessments. It focuses mainly on
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 the probabilistic framework for system security, in the context of power system 
operation.  
 
 
2.2 Power System Security 
 
 
Power system security is usually assessed on the basis of security standards, i.e., the 
relationship between outages of generation and transmission plant and the level of 
any acceptable loss of demand. An 'N-1' security standard requires the system to 
work satisfactorily following loss of any one of its N elements (Strbac, 2001). 
Loading on transmission system under normal operating conditions must be 
limited to levels that permit any "credible contingency" to occur without exceeding 
acceptable power quality, component or system limits (Strbac, 2001). 
Contingencies may be external or internal events (for instance, faults 
subsequent to lightning versus operator-initiated switching sequences) and may 
consist of small/slow or large/fast disturbances (for example, random behaviour of 
the demand pattern versus generator or line tripping) (Wehenkel, 1997). 
Usually, numerical simulation of the contingency scenario is used to assess 
the effect of a contingency on a power system in a given state. However, the non-
linear nature of the physical phenomena and the growing complexity of real-life 
power systems make security assessment difficult. For example, monitoring a power 
system every day calls for fast sensitivity analysis to identify the salient parameters 
driving the phenomena, and suggestions on how to act on the system so as to 
increase its level of security (Wehenkel, 1997). 
On the other hand, increasing economic and environmental pressures make 
the conflicting aspects of security and economy even more challenging as instead of 
building of new transmission lines and generation facilities, operators tend to 
operate power systems more closer to the critical limits (Wehenkel, 1997). 
Every small change in load is a disturbance that causes a change in system 
conditions. However, system security is assessed for larger changes that cause major 
changes in system conditions. These changes are mainly caused by contingencies. 
Most commonly contingencies result in relay operations that are designed to protect 
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the system from faults or abnormal conditions. Typical relay operations result in the 
loss of a line, transformer, generator, or major load (McCalley, 2000). 
Various components in a power system respond to changes that occur and 
may reach an equilibrium condition that is acceptable according to some criteria. 
Mathematical analysis of these responses and the new equilibrium condition is 
called security analysis (McCalley, 2000). 
The decision drivers of security can be classified as shown in Figure 2.1 and 
the corresponding time frames for making security related decision are given in 
Table 2.1.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 : Decision drivers of power system security 
 
Table 2.1 : Security related decisions  
 
Time-frame Decision-
maker 
Decision Basis for decision 
On-line assessment 
(Minutes to hours) 
Operator How to constrain the 
economic operation to 
maintain the normal state? 
Operating rules, online 
assessment, and cost 
Operational planning 
(Hours to months) 
Analyst What should be the operating 
rules? 
Minimum operating 
criteria, reliability, and 
cost 
Planning (Months to 
years) 
Analyst How to reinforce/maintain 
the transmission system? 
Reliability criteria for 
system design and cost 
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If the analysis evaluates only the expected post disturbance equilibrium 
condition (steady-state operating point), then it is called Static Security Assessment 
(SSA). Static or steady state security is the ability of the system to supply load 
without violating operating conditions and load curtailment (Kirshen, 2001), (Kim & 
Singh, 2002). 
If the analysis evaluates the transient performance of the system as it 
progresses after the disturbance, then it is called Dynamic Security Assessment 
(DSA) (Grigsby, 2001), (Silva et al., 1999), (Ejebe et al., 1998). Further, the DSA 
has been formally defined by the IEEE, Power Engineering Society (PES) working 
group on DSA as an evaluation of the ability of a certain power system to withstand 
a defined set of contingencies and to survive the transition to an acceptable steady 
state condition. Dynamic security considers the ability of the system to supply the 
load against system dynamic problems of early swing, transient instability and 
oscillatory instability (Kirshen, 2001),  (McCalley, Vittal & Abi-Samra, 1999). 
Voltage security is the ability of a system, not only to operate in a stable 
manner, but also to remain stable (maintenance of system voltage) following any 
reasonable credible contingency or adverse system change (Kirshen, 2001), 
(Knight,2000). Voltage security analysis is performed to investigate whether any 
contingency triggers a voltage collapse (Kirshen, 2001). 
SSA can be used quickly to determine if a system is insecure by simply 
looking at the static outcome of each contingency. However, to know whether the 
system is fully secured, DSA must be performed. It determines if the associated 
dynamics of each contingency are acceptable. 
A power system always resides in one of four states called normal, alert, 
emergency, and restorative. The emergency state can be extreme, temporary, or 
controlled (Fink & Carlsen, 1978). The importance of the four security states is that 
they provide a conceptual basis for making security-related decisions. This basis 
rests on the assumption that any normal state is acceptable and any other state is 
unacceptable. Figure 2.2 shows the power system states and the corresponding 
actions. 
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Figure 2.2 : Power system states and actions  
 
The system planner and operator always have to consider security. Planning 
standards are more rigorous than operational standards. For example, the 
uncertainty in demand is not considered in operational standards. 
Traditionally, security-related decisions in both operations and planning 
have been made with the criterion being that the power system should remain in the 
normal state at all times (McCalley, Vittal & Abi-Samra, 1999). The fundamental 
drawback of this approach is that it does not reflect the quantitative difference that 
can exist between two states that are considered secure. 
While security assessment explores the three main areas shown in Figure 
2.1, these assessments must be performed in a critical time frame. Figure 2.3 shows 
the time frames that are applicable to emergency control actions (Knight, 1983). 
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Figure 2.3 : Time scales in emergency control actions  
 
The introduction of competitive supply and the accompanying opening of the 
transmission network have resulted in more highly stressed operating conditions, 
more vulnerable networks, and an increased need to identify the operational security 
level of the transmission system. 
The determination of the security level, for given operating conditions, has 
been done traditionally using deterministic method where an operating condition is 
identified as secure or insecure according to whether each and every contingency in 
a pre-defined set (the contingency set) satisfies specified network performance 
criteria. If one or more contingencies cause violations of these operating conditions, 
then action is taken to move the security level into the secure region. If no 
contingencies cause violations, then no action need to be taken, or actions can be 
taken to enhance the economic efficiency of the delivery of energy to end users 
(McCalley et al., 2001). 
Security assessment approaches can be mainly classified either as 
deterministic or probabilistic. Deterministic methods provide very simple rule for 
use in making decisions. However, with the industry's emphasis on economic 
competition, and with the associated increased network vulnerability, researchers 
have looked for other techniques that can indicate whether the system is sufficiently 
secure while operating as economically as possible (Fink, 1988). 
 
 
Action to contain ------- Action to prevent 
Action to prevent ------ severe generation dynamic instability 
 
        1-----------------secs-----------60 
1 -----------  mins --------10 
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2.3  Steady State Security Assessments 
 
 
2.3.1  Deterministic Approach 
 
 
The current and traditional practice uses deterministic methods with safety margins 
to cover all the possible unknown uncertainties (McCalley, Vittal & Abi-Samra, 
1999). In the deterministic security assessment there are six basic steps in 
constructing a deterministic security boundary. They are (McCalley et al., 2001), 
(Chen & McCalley, 2000) : 
I.  Develop a power flow base case corresponding to the time-period (year, 
season) and loading conditions (peak, partial peak, off peak). Unit 
commitment is selected based on typical unit availability for the chosen 
time-period. The topologies selected are normally all circuits in service. 
Sometimes sensitivity studies are also performed for a few weakened 
topologies. In addition, short- term operational studies are often performed 
with the explicit purpose of identifying limits for topologies expected in the 
near future. 
II. Select the contingency set. Normally this set consists of all 'N-1' events, 
although some particularly credible 'N-2' events may be included (e.g. two 
circuits on the same towers). This may be shortened to only include events 
resulting in performance that is affected by operating conditions or facilities 
pertinent to the goals of the study. Traditionally, this has been done based on 
experience and knowledge of the system. 
III. Identify the study parameters, which are to be maximised and the study range 
of operating conditions. These study parameters are typically generation 
levels for specific generators and power transfers over specific transmission 
paths. 
IV. Identify the event or events that "first" violate the performance evaluation 
criteria as operational stress is increased within the study range. These events 
are referred to as the limiting contingencies. If there are no such violations 
within the study range, the region is not security constrained, and the study is 
complete. 
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V. Identify the set of operating conditions within the study range where a 
limiting contingency "first" violates the performance evaluation criteria. This 
set of operating conditions constitutes a line that partitions the study range 
when we consider two study parameters, a surface when there are three study 
parameters or a hyper surface for more than three study parameters. This 
line, surface, or hyper-surface is the security boundary. 
VI  Condense the security boundary into a set of plots or tables that are easily 
understood and used by the operator. Nomo grams are one of the common 
ways of expressing the security boundaries. 
 
 
2.3.2  Probabilistic Approach 
 
 
The power systems have shifted from a regulated system to a competitive uncertain 
market environment. This has led operators to face more pressure, from economic 
imperatives in the market place, to operate the power systems with lower security 
margins. To operate the system closer to the traditional deterministic limits, or even 
beyond them, more refined methods for power system security assessment are 
needed that account for the probabilistic nature of uncertain variables in the 
decision-making environment (McCalley, Vittal & Abi-Samra, 1999). 
Some researches use analytical approaches (sometimes called contingency 
enumeration) to solve probabilistic problems, while others use Monte Carlo 
simulation for the same purpose. Analytical methods based on conditional 
probability, however, are computationally intensive when applied to a system with 
many components (Kim & Singh, 2002). Monte Carlo simulation however is 
suitable for analysis of complicated systems. 
In a probabilistic security assessment, steps of I to III and VI remain as in 
section 2.3.1. However, steps IV and V have to be modified as follows (McCalley et 
al., 2001), (Chen & McCalley, 2000) : 
IV  Evaluate the probabilistic index throughout the study range. Decide on a 
particular threshold level beyond which operation is deemed unacceptable. 
VI.  Identify the set of operating conditions within the study range that have an 
index evaluation equal to the threshold level. This set of operating conditions 
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constitutes the line (for two study parameters), a surface (for three) or a 
hyper surface (for more than three) that partitions the study range. This line 
surface, or hyper surface represents the security boundary; it delineates 
between acceptable regions of operation. 
 
 
2.3.3  Comparison of the Probabilistic and Deterministic Approaches 
 
 
It is known that probabilistic methods constitute powerful tools for use in many 
kinds of decision-making problems. Probabilistic assessments play an important part 
when an outcome is associated with uncertainties (Sobajic, 2001). 
The acceptance of probabilistic approaches is slow, mainly because they have 
not acquired the level of credibility, which is accorded to the much simpler and more 
transparent deterministic methods (Endrenyi, 2000). 
 There are also several drawbacks with the deterministic approach (Endrenyi, 
2000), (McCalley et al., 2001) : 
• It ignores the variability in input data. 
• The selection of credible contingencies does not include events like cascading 
tripping of lines or sympathetic tripping. Apparently unlikely conditions may be 
under estimated. 
• The assumption of no failure risk in plans satisfying traditional criteria is 
misleading; in fact, the approach provides no idea on how safe the operating plan 
actually is. 
• It does not signal on severity of risk beyond the deterministic security boundary. 
• It ignores the effects of uncertainty in operating conditions. 
 
 These drawbacks can be alleviated with the probabilistic approach because 
(McCalley et al., 2001) : 
• It considers the probability of the possible outages. 
• It captures the increased risk caused by multiple constraints as it sums risk 
associated with all contingencies and problems. 
• It can reflect the risk associated with the insecure region. 
• It does consider the uncertainty in near future operating conditions. 
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Therefore, it is also vital to investigate alternative security assessment tools 
that combine the positive properties of deterministic and probabilistic security 
indications. 
 
 
2.4  Dynamic Security Assessment 
 
 
Dynamic security assessment is the primary concern in systems that are constrained 
by stability limits. Such assessments are performed at three stages: on-line, 
operation planning and expansion planning (Silva et al., 1999). 
 
 A real time (on-line) dynamic security assessment (Ejebe et al., 1998) : 
• Provides the system operator the information on the security status of the system. 
• Determines the relevant operating limits (interface flow limits, generation limits) 
to ensure the dynamic security of the system in the event of occurrence of any 
critical contingencies. 
• Identifies the limiting contingencies and computes indices quantifying the degree 
of stability or instability for each case. 
 
 There are sets of criteria that are to be satisfied with the dynamic security 
assessment. They are (Ejebe et al., 1998) : 
• Initial transient stability (plant mode and area mode; single and multi swing). 
• Voltage excursions (dip or rise) beyond specified threshold level and duration. 
• Relay margin criteria. 
• Minimum damping criteria for a designated short list of contingencies. 
 
The security function in a dynamic security assessment computes the 
interface flow limits that ensure dynamic security of the system for severe 
contingencies. The interface flows are calculated by performing a series of power 
flow and time domain simulations. 
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 The basic steps to calculate the interface flow are (Ejebe et al., 1998) : 
I. Select a desired interface flow 
II. Change the generation and load in the appropriate control areas to obtain the 
desired interface flow. Solve the power flow. Selection of the generators to 
change depends on the practices of the utility. Generators are typically 
dispatched economically. 
III. Using time domain analysis (numerical methods such as the implicit 
trapezoidal method to discretize the differential equations at each time step 
and iteratively solve the machine equations and the network equations) with 
early termination, simulate the contingency and compute the transient stability 
index (TSI). If TSI is within the prescribed (marginally stable) threshold, then 
the limiting interface flow has been found. Otherwise go to IV step. 
IV. Reduce interface flow if unstable (TSI is negative), or increase it if stable (if 
TSI is positive). Repeat the II and III steps. 
 
 The security function captures the interface flow for which TSI is very small 
and within specified tolerance. The operating guidelines are established based on the 
most limiting interface flow (Ejebe et al., 1998). If any of the contingencies results 
in instability, then the operator is notified immediately to take corrective actions. 
 
 
2.5  Risk Based Probabilistic Approaches in Power System Security 
 
 
Today, transmission and generation owners are keen to fully utilize their facilities to 
maximize the return on their investment. Deterministic assessment does not provide 
sufficient information on insecurity beyond the deterministic boundary. To alleviate 
such limitations reference (McCalley, Vittal & Abi-Samra, 1999), proposes a risk 
based security index that can captures the security level and recognises the likelihood 
and monetary impacts of unlikely events. The index proposed in (McCalley, Vittal & 
Abi-Samra, 1999), measures the system's exposure to failure considering load 
interruption, equipment damage, and opportunity costs due to equipment outages. 
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 The basic mathematical formulation for calculating the risk is given by 
Equation (2.1). 
  
             Risk (Im|Xt) =  E( Im (Xi+1|Xt) 
                  
       ) x Risk (Im|                  (2.1) 
 
Where Im denotes the impact or cost-consequences associated with load 
interruption, equipment damage, or opportunity cost due to equipment 
unavailability. The risk associated with the pre-contingency operating condition Xt 
(e.g. loading, dispatch, voltage profile) is given by the expected values of the 
monetary impact of the operating condition in the next time period Xt+1 (the next 
hour) given the current operating condition, i.e., E(Im(Xt+1) | Xt). This expectation is 
the integral of the product of probability of the uncertain event, defined by Ei (the 
contingency state) and Xt+1 (operating condition in the next time step) times its 
corresponding impact over the set of all possible events. 
The risk based security assessment proposed in (McCalley, Vittal & Abi-
Samra, 1999), considers the impact of a specified contingency state Ei for a specified 
operating condition Xt+1 . Its result is denoted by Risk (Im | Ei, Xt+1) . The set of 
contingency states {Ei, i = 0, N} includes the possibility that the current state 
remains the same, i.e., an outage does not occur. 
The uncertainty associated with the impact depends on the nature of the 
impact. For line overload, the uncertainty is with the ambient temperature, wind 
speed and direction, and solar flux (Wan, Mccalley & Vittal, 1999). For transformer 
overload, it is the ambient temperature and transformer's loading cycle (Fu, 
McCalley & Vittal, 2001). For voltage security it is the interruption voltage level of 
the loads at each bus (Wan, McCalley & Vittal, 2000). For dynamic (angle) security, 
it is in the fault type and fault location of the outaged circuit corresponding to 
contingency state Ei (McCalley et al., 1997), (Vittal, et al., 1999). 
Reference (McCalley, Vittal & Abi-Samra, 1999), claims that the following 
benefits can be achieved using the risk based security assessment when applied to 
security problems in a power system : 
 •    Since the risk based security assessment is performed through the expected cost  
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due to possible insecurity problems, it can signal the security and economy 
against a particular operating condition. Such information is vital in 
security/economy decision-making as the operator has the option to trade off 
security with economy. 
• Since the risk index may carry the information that may be related to the next 
minutes, hours, weeks, or years, such information can be used for preventive 
decisions against future operating conditions. 
• Since the risk is assigned considering the problems due to each contingency and 
each component, it provides vital information to identify particularly risky 
components or operating conditions. 
• Since the proposed risk-based security assessment can be used to calculate a risk 
index for over load, voltage and dynamic (angle) security problems, it can reflect 
the composite security level in the region. 
• Risk can also be calculated for a time-period by summing over all the time 
instances for each operating condition. Such information on cumulative risk may 
be useful in assessing the influence on the security level of a particular facility 
plan. 
 
 
2.6  Risk Assessment Techniques in Power System Adequacy 
 
 
2.6.1  Operating Reserve Risk Assessment 
 
 
The two broad categories of reserve assessment in composite power systems are the 
deterministic and probabilistic approaches. Deterministic criteria include 
considerations such as percentage of system load or operating capacity, fixed 
capacity margins, and the largest unit loading. Such an approach does not 
specifically recognize the probability of component failures. 
A probabilistic approach can be used to recognize the stochastic nature of 
system components and incorporate these phenomena in a consistent evaluation of 
the required operating reserve. The magnitude of the operating reserve and the 
actual spinning requirement can be determined on the basis of system risk. 
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This risk has been defined in (Billinton & Allan, 1984), (Lian & Billinton, 
1994) as the probability that the system will fail to meet the load or be able to just  
meet the load during a specified time in the future. This duration is known as the 
lead time and failed generating units are normally not replaced or restored to service 
during this time period. In addition, the availabilities and unavailabilities of major 
system elements are all functions of the studied time period, i.e., the lead-time. The 
calculated system operating risk is, therefore, a function of the lead- time. 
In the basic approach to operating capacity reserve assessment, each 
generating unit is represented by a two state model as shown in Figure 2.4, which 
includes an operating state and a failed state. In this model   and   are the unit 
failure and repair states. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 : Component two state model 
 
The time dependent availabilities and un-availabilities of the generating units 
are used to create the capacity outage probability table. The availability and 
unavailability of a generating unit at lead-time T are given by Equations (2.2) and 
(2.3) respectively. 
         
 
    
 

   
           (2.2) 
 
         

    
 

   
           (2.3) 
 
In addition, the transmission facilities can also be represented by the two-
state model that is same as shown in Figure 2.4. The time-dependent state 
probabilities of these components can therefore be calculated using Equations (2.2) 
and (2.3). The combined outages of both generation and transmission facilities can 
then be obtained assuming that these outages are independent. 
Risk assessment of composite systems can consider a number of additional 
constraints such as acceptable voltages at load busses, transmission line load 
carrying capacities and real and reactive power considerations. In order to calculate 
the operating capacity risk, the composite power system can be categorised using a 
Down state 
2 
Up state 
1 
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group of mutually exclusive operating states designated in terms of the degree to 
which the security constraints are satisfied. These operating states include normal, 
alert, emergency, extreme emergency and restorative. 
 The composite system risk assessment procedure involves two basic steps : 
identifying events that lead to each of the operating states and calculating the 
probabilities of each states resulting from the identified events. According to the 
definitions of composite system operating states no constraints are violated or load 
curtailed in either the normal or alert state and therefore the system is not at risk in 
either of these two states. 
 A Composite System Operating State Risk (CSOSR) can therefore be 
calculated by Equation (2.4) :  
CSOSR = 1.0 - Pn - Pa    (2.4) 
 
Where, Pn and Pa are the probabilities of normal and alert states respectively. 
 
The summation of the two probabilities of the normal and alert states 
provides an assessment of the favourable conditions associated with the system. The 
complement of the sum of these two probabilities represents the unfavourable 
conditions and hence constitutes the system risk level. In this approach the 
continuous Markov model (Billinton & Allan, 1983), which can be represented as a 
discrete process moving in small steps, is used to calculate the required time 
dependent state probabilities. 
 
 
2.6.2  Risk Based Assessments of Available Transfer Capability 
 
 
The knowledge of available transfer capability (ATC) is vital in order to 
guide the implementation and to make competition effective and reasonable (Ou & 
Singh, 2003). 
Mathematically ATC can be represented as in Equation (2.5) : 
 
ATC = TTC - Base_Case_Flow - TRM – CBM   (2.5) 
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Where, TTC is the total transfer capability, TRM is the transmission reliability 
margin, and CBM is the capacity benefit margin. 
TTC is the largest value of power transfer that causes no violations, with or 
without contingency. TRM accounts for the inherent uncertainty in system conditions 
and the need for operating flexibility to ensure reliable system operation as system 
conditions change. 
Among the various probabilistic approaches the Monte Carlo simulation has 
been proposed in (Ou & Singh, 2003). CBM is the transfer capability reserved by 
load serving entities to ensure access to generation from interconnected systems to 
meet generation reliability requirements. 
The general procedure using a combination of Monte Carlo simulation and 
Repeated Power Flow (RPF), (Ou & Singh, 2001), (Ou & Singh, 2002) to determine 
TTC/ TRM is shown in Figure 2.5. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 : General procedure for calculating ATC  
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In this assessment the risk is defined as (Ou & Singh, 2003)  : 
 
         
           
 
                         (2.6) 
 
Where T represents the level of transfer and N represents the number of sampled 
states and ATC(i) represents ATC level for system state i. 
 
The percentile of a probabilistic variable can be defined as : 
 
probability(ATC(i) ≤ value) = percentile   (2.7) 
  
Therefore, reference (Ou & Singh, 2003) suggests to use percentile to judge risk. 
 
 
2.7 Risk Assessment Techniques in Power System Security 
 
 
2.7.1 Risk of Transmission Line Overload 
 
 
Power transfer in a transmission conductor is limited by the conductor's maximum 
design temperature, which determines the maximum sag of the conductor, and the 
rate of annealing. Annealing is the re-crystallisation of metal. The impacts of 
thermal overload is calculated considering sag and loss of strength of the conductor 
and the impacts of sag and loss of strength are given by Equation (2.8) and (2.9) 
respectively (Wan, McCalley & Vittal, 1999). 
 
          
            
          
     (2.8) 
 
             
  
  
           
          
    (2.9) 
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Where, 
         =               
         =        (or financial cost) corresponding to an outage of the  
                           overload circuit 
    =                      
       =                           
     =                       
         =                     
     =                                            
     =                                          
     =                                     
 
I[Fault ] is dependent on operating conditions, and its quantification requires 
analysis with power flow and stability simulation. 
 For a given current I, the thermal overload risk can be expressed as the 
probability of the conductor temperature being greater than      times its related 
impact. It is given by Equation (2.10) : 
 
            
      
                 (2.10) 
 
The conductor temperature   is influenced by the conductor current I and the 
ambient conditions.        is the probability density function of   for given I, 
          is the impact of sag of   for given I, and R(I) is the risk of line 
overloading.  
 
 
2.7.2  Risk of Transformer Loading 
 
 
Reference (Fu, McCalley & Vittal, 2001), proposes a risk assessment technique for 
transformer loading capability, taking into account the probabilistic nature of time-
varying loads and ambient temperature. In a transformer the loading capability is 
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